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Issues and Recommendations 
Global Migration Governance and Mixed Flows. 
Implications for Development-centred Policies 
Managing migration and forced displacement pres-
ents great challenges to many industrialised coun-
tries, and even more so to emerging and developing 
economies. Governments feel torn. While continuing 
to regard refugee and migration policy as a “domaine 
réservé” of core national sovereignty, they are well 
aware that their scope for unilateral action is limited 
and that they can no longer tackle their migration 
and refugee problems in isolation. 
These difficulties are exacerbated by the increasing 
mixing of refugee and other migratory movements, 
with the distinction between the two becoming in-
creasingly blurred. Yet it is a distinction that the signa-
tories of the Geneva Refugee Convention are required 
to make: They are obliged to protect refugees but free 
to decide as they wish whether to accept migrants. 
They find it particularly difficult to deal appropriately 
with people who have been forced to leave their home 
country but fall outside the criteria of the Geneva 
Refugee Convention. This has given rise to a protec-
tion gap that is affecting an increasing number of 
people. 
Such mixed migrations amplify the need for inter-
national cooperation in refugee and migration policy, 
or global migration governance. At present that co-
operation is incomplete, fragmented and ineffective, 
and fails to meet the challenges. Against this back-
ground, great hopes are placed in the ability of devel-
opment cooperation to reduce the causes of migra-
tion, support partner states and promote cooperation. 
But it often remains unclear in what ways forced dis-
placement, migration and development are inter-
linked, and what development cooperation can effec-
tively achieve. 
So on the one hand, it is clear that voluntary and 
regular migration contributes to the development of 
countries of origin and destination and should there-
fore be promoted. For example, remittances form an 
important income stream for family members and for 
countries of origin, while immigration can help desti-
nation countries to address labour shortages. On the 
other hand, unregulated and involuntary movements 
create development risks. These principally affect de-
veloping countries, which in global terms host most 
of the refugees and displaced persons. Additionally, in 
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the absence of legal pathways much of South-North 
migration takes place by irregular channels, creating 
its own risks for those involved, as well as for the tran-
sit and receiving countries. Whether movements have 
positive or negative development impacts depends not 
least on whether they are complemented by develop-
ment interventions. 
In practice, development cooperation is increasing-
ly aimed at enhancing migration control – although 
from a development perspective, it would be better 
to first ask which migration and refugee policies best 
assist partner countries’ development. To date the 
international framework has failed to facilitate the 
systematic inclusion of development aspects. While 
the international community has put considerable 
efforts into establishing stable international struc-
tures in policy areas like climate change, trade and 
finance, the equivalent for global migration govern-
ance remains lacking. While the refugee protection 
regime – despite being threatened by erosion – is 
firmly institutionalised and rooted in international 
law, migration policy remains a patchwork of regional 
and bilateral agreements and coordinating mecha-
nisms. 
This dichotomy has historical origins, and is shaped 
by the power imbalance between countries of origin, 
transit and destination. From a development perspec-
tive, migration governance in particular leaves much 
to be desired, because the current institutional struc-
tures lack normative orientation, are unsuited for 
cooperative partnership between states, and fail to 
adequately protect the rights of migrants. The struc-
tures for refugees are better developed, yet also entail 
deficits. Against this background, it is obvious that a 
committed cooperation on refugee and migration 
questions with binding norms, responsibilities and 
institutions would create added value in development. 
A development-led global order for refugees and 
migration would secure the rights of migrants and 
refugees; define minimum standards for refugees, 
migrants and integration; and enable a fair reconcilia-
tion of interests between countries of origin, transit 
and destination. Such cooperation could contribute to 
reducing the causes of forced migration, convert more 
irregular movements into regular ones, and offer a 
framework for local integration, return and reintegra-
tion. 
Important institutional and policy changes are cur-
rently under way, with the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2015 
introducing binding targets and indicators for migra-
tion. And in September 2016 the international com-
munity decided to prepare two global compacts – one 
for migration, one for refugees – within the space of 
two years. Both will have repercussions for the inter-
national institutional setup. On the one hand, they 
will reconfigure the relationships and division of 
responsibilities between the three central organisa-
tions in the field of migration and refugees: the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR), the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organi-
sation (ILO). On the other, it is foreseeable that the 
existing intergovernmental consultative forums will 
continue to gain in political weight and fill new roles 
in the international governance of migration. This 
applies in particular to the Global Forum for Migra-
tion and Development (GFMD) and the UN High Level 
Dialogue on Migration and Development (HLD). 
The German government needs to position itself in 
all these processes. There are three principal options 
for the future institutional set-up of global migration 
governance: (1) consolidation of the existing struc-
tures; (2) expansion of the remit of IOM; and (3) estab-
lishment of a UN migration secretariat. The German 
government should weigh up the pros and cons of 
each of these options and get behind the one that 
offers the best prospects of creating a viable and de-
velopment-led structure for global migration govern-
ance. Such engagement can potentially consolidate 
Germany’s international reputation as a significant 
actor in questions relating to migration and forced 
displacement – and ultimately lay the groundwork for 
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Mixed Migration and Development 
 
Many countries struggle with the increasingly blurred 
line between forced and voluntary migration. The 
motivations and routes of refugees and migrants are 
getting harder to differentiate, with the traditional 
distinction between forced movement of refugees and 
voluntary migration now rarely adequately describing 
the realities. Many people leave their home countries 
involuntarily since they find themselves forced to 
migrate after losing their livelihoods through political 
and economic upheavals or climate change. In addi-
tion, refugees and migrants tend to face similar dan-
gers during their often irregular journeys. But only 
those who can prove they suffered individual persecu-
tion in their home country are entitled to internation-
al protection under the criteria of the Geneva Refugee 
Convention. The question of taking in migrants and 
admitting them to the labour market, on the other 
hand, is a sovereign and interest-led matter for the 
respective country of destination.1 This results in pro-
tection gaps for particular groups of migrants and 
forcibly displaced persons. The phenomenon is by no 
means restricted to Europe or Germany. According 
to UNHCR, mixed migration is growing in the Medi-
terranean region, the area around the Gulf of Aden, 
Central America and the Caribbean, South-East Asia, 
and the Balkans.2 
 
1 Jørgen Carling, Anne T. Gallagher and Christopher Horwood, 
Beyond Definitions: Global Migration and the Smuggling-trafficking 
Nexus, Discussion Paper 2 (Nairobi: Regional Mixed Migration 
Secretariat, November 2015), 1, http://www.regionalmms.org/ 
images/DiscussionPapers/Beyond_Definitions.pdf (accessed 
7 March 2017). Of course mixed migrations are not an entirely 
new phenomenon, and were already attracting academic and 
political attention during the early 1990s in connection with the 
global rise in refugee movements. In the course of the 2000s the 
term found increasingly currency among international organisa-
tions and forums such as the UN General Assembly and the EU’s 
High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) 
(along with the broader term “asylum and migration nexus”). 
2 UNHCR, Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action, (2007), http:// 
www.unhcr.org/mixed-migration.html (accessed 7 March 2017). 
Also World Bank, Forcibly Displaced – Toward a Development Ap-
proach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts 
(2016), 34, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/ 
handle/10986/25016/9781464809385.pdf?sequence=2&is 
Allowed=y (accessed 7 March 2017). 
Two developments in particular exacerbate the 
difficulties of distinguishing refugees and migrants. 
First of all, the causes of forced displacement have 
changed since the Second World War. In line with its 
historical context, the Geneva Refugee Convention of 
1951 concentrated above all on persecution of indi-
vidual and groups by state actors. In the interim, how-
ever, other grounds have gained prominence, espe-
cially general and gender-specific violence. And more 
people today leave after losing their livelihoods 
through economic troubles or ecological disaster. 
Like climate change, these causes are not taken into 
account in the existing international treaties; instead 
they are treated as migration push factors. 
The second change is that refugees and migrants 
increasingly use the same (irregular) routes and seek 
the assistance of the same traffickers, principally 
because most industrialised countries and emerging 
economies fail to offer adequate legal pathways. On 
the contrary, increasing numbers of states are restrict-
ing the legal options for refugees to seek protection 
by introducing restrictive new national asylum legisla-
tion. This applies in the EU as well as in many other 
regions of the world.3 Similar restrictive trends are 
seen in migration, despite countervailing experiments 
in certain countries, such as the anti-cyclical opening 
of the Swedish labour market in 2009. Most industrial-
ised countries lack legal immigration options and 
their governments pursue restrictive policies for 
domestic political reasons – even if demographic and 
economic considerations indicate a need for more 
immigration. When confronted with these realities, 
many migrants make pragmatic decisions, weighing 
up whether irregularity or an asylum application 
offers more promising prospects. Some then seek to 
obtain residence through the asylum system. 
This mixing of refugee and migration movements 
heaps yet more pressure on an already overstretched 
asylum system and ultimately delegitimises both 
 
3 Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz, “Another Brick in the 
Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the Externalization of Asylum by 
Australia and Europe”, Government and Opposition 43, no. 2 (2008): 
249–69, and James Hollifield, Philip Martin and Pia Orrenius, 
eds, Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2014). 
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asylum and migration policy. The respective govern-
ments and the international organisations dealing 
with refugees and migration are well aware of the 
problems. Yet in practice there is still a lack of con-
cepts and practical approaches for untangling refugee 
and migration movements in such a way as to pre-
serve refugee protection, satisfy the migration inter-
ests of the countries of origin and destination, and 
respect the rights of all people on the move. 
Global Migration Trends 
Knowledge about the international migration situa-
tion has improved greatly in recent decades, but im-
portant gaps remain. Many countries still lack reliable 
data on immigration, on numbers of refugees and 
migrants, and on their socio-economic impacts. Inter-
nationally comparable statistics remain rare,4 and 
future migratory movements virtually impossible to 
predict. As well as hampering migration management, 
this also presents obstacles to an assessment of the 
economic, social and security-related consequences, 
and to the preparation of development strategies.5 
Nevertheless, those statistics that do exist permit us 
at least to outline the basic trends in international 
migration. 
According to United Nations estimates, more than 
one billion people globally are migrants of some kind: 
244 million live as refugees and migrants outside their 
home countries; another 740 million are internal 
migrants or IDPs. Altogether the number of interna-
tional refugees and migrants has risen by 41 percent 
over the course of the past fifteen years. The rise is 
principally accounted for by population growth, with 
the proportion in relation to global population having 
increased only slightly over the past five decades, from 
2.5 percent in 1965 to 3.3 percent in 2015.6 A consider-
able portion of these cross-border movements occurs 
between poorer countries, rather than towards indus-
 
4 Steffen Angenendt, David Kipp and Anne Koch, Many Refugees, 
Poor Data: Development Cooperation Requires Higher-Quality Data, 
SWP Comments 2016/C37 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, August 2016). 
5 World Bank, Forcibly Displaced (see note 2), 13–18. 
6 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision 
(2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/ 
migration/data/estimates2/data/UN_MigrantStockTotal_ 
2015.xlsx (accessed 7 March 2017). 
trialised countries.7 A smaller group does move to 
industrialised countries, but even here most do not 
leave their home region. This applies equally to refu-
gees and to labour migrants, although the proportion 
seeking protection or employment in geographically 
distant locales has been growing. 
At the end of 2016 the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was respon-
sible for 17.2 million international refugees, the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees (UNWRA) for another 5.3 million.8 These 
figures do not include internally displaced persons 
(which UNHCR estimates put at about 40 million) or 
asylum-seekers (2.8 million). And only very rough 
estimates are available for the number of people work-
ing elsewhere within their home country as internal 
migrants. In China the figure is reported to be more 
than 277 million, or about one-third of the working 
population.9 
Altogether the international migration situation 
is characterised by simultaneous regionalisation and 
globalisation. Both regional and global migratory 
movements are on the rise, with the former quantita-
tively more significant than the latter. Africa and Asia 
especially have witnessed increasing and diversifying 
internal and international movements, with trends 
including feminisation of migration,10 rapidly grow-
ing rural-to-urban migration,11 and increasing labour 
migration between economically less and more devel-
oped regions.12 A considerable proportion of migra-
 
7 In 2015 there were 85.3 million refugees and migrants from 
developing countries living in industrial and emerging econo-
mies, but 90.2 million in other developing countries. So with 
a global share of 37 percent, movements between developing 
countries (South-South) exceeded those from developing to 
industrialised countries (South-North) by 2 percentage points. 
Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC), Global Migration 
Trends Factsheet 2015 (Berlin, 2016), 7. 
8 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016 (19 June 2017), 
http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34 (accessed 21 June 2017). 
9 “Migrant Workers and Their Children”, China Labour Bulletin 
(Hong Kong), 2015, http://www.clb.org.hk/content/migrant-
workers-and-their-children (accessed 7 March 2017). 
10 Katharine M. Donato and Donna Gabaccia, Gender and Inter-
national Migration: From the Slavery Era to the Global Age (New York, 
2016), 19–37. 
11 International Organization for Migration, World Migration 
Report 2015 – Migrants and Cities: New Partnerships to Manage Mobility 
(Geneva, 2015), 52–55. 
12 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, International Migration Report 2015, ST/ESA/SER.A/384 
(New York, September 2016), http://www.un.org/en/development/ 
desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/ 
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tion on both continents can be attributed to political 
factors such as war and conflict, and in some cases 
also ecological factors. But these similarities aside, 
international migration movements and the associ-
ated challenges are extremely heterogeneous. 
Development Impacts of Migration 
and Refugee Movements 
Development and international migration are intima-
tely bound up together, with cause and effect hotly 
debated for decades.13 The relationship between refu-
gee movements and development, on the other hand, 
has only come onto the political radar in recent years. 
At the same time it is obvious that the development 
effects of all such movements depend decisively on 
their political management. Fundamentally, the 
effects of irregular movements on countries of origin 
and destination are less positive and conducive to 
development than those of regular movements. Oppor-
tunities for refugees and migrants themselves are also 
scarcer when cross-border movements are not accom-
panied by appropriate political measures. 
In discussions about the interlinkages between 
cross-border movements and development, positive 
and negative assessments have alternated periodically, 
with the dominant interpretation of the day always 
shaping the way movements are treated in develop-
ment policy. This is especially clear in the migration 
debate, where migration was viewed overwhelmingly 
positively in the 1950s and 1960s – above all as a 
balancing mechanism between labour markets with 
different supply and demand structures. It was 
assumed that labour migration – in Western indus-
trialised countries during that period above all that 
of unskilled and semi-skilled workers for mining and 
industry – contributed to growth in countries of 
origin and destination.14 During the 1970s and 1980s 
this optimism was superseded by a more pessimistic 
line, dominated by criticisms that labour migrants 
 
docs/MigrationReport2015.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017). 
13 Ernst Spaan, Ton van Naerssen and Felicitas Hillmann, 
“Shifts in the European Discourses on Migration and Develop-
ment”, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 14, no. 1/2 (2005): 35–69; 
Hein de Haas, “Migration and Development: A Theoretical 
Perspective”, International Migration Review 44, no. 1 (2010):  
227–64. 
14 Michael P. Todaro, “A Model of Labor Migration and Urban 
Unemployment in Less-Developed Countries”, American Economic 
Review 59 (1969): 138–48. 
were exploited and that the process siphoned off 
skilled workers who were needed at home (“brain 
drain”). Financial transfers by migrants were also re-
garded as problematic, as it was assumed that remit-
tances were spent largely on consumption rather than 
promoting development.15 
The pendulum has swung back again since the 
early 1990s, with the “new economics of labour migra-
tion” paradigm attributing migration a positive in-
fluence on development processes.16 This optimistic 
assessment of the relationship has not been restricted 
to academia, and has also left its mark on the debates 
in international organisations and forums, as well 
as initiating institutional changes.17 Well into the 
1990s it was also widely assumed that migration from 
poorer to richer regions of the world could be reduced 
using the tools of development cooperation, and that 
more development would lead to less migration. This 
theory was succeeded by the idea of the “migration 
hump” from development economics: that develop-
ment processes initially cause migration to increase.18 
One reason for this lies in the wider availability of the 
material resources required for cross-border move-
ments, another in improved access to education and 
training, which become available to wider circles 
in the course of development but often without a 
matching expansion of employment opportunities in 
the country concerned. Young people in particular 
then seek their fortune abroad. 
 
15 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Philip L. Martin, eds, 
The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migration and Economic Development 
(Westport, CT, 1991); Reginald T. Appleyard, “Migration and 
Development: Myths and Reality”, International Migration Review 
23, no. 3 (1989): 486–99; John R. Lewis, “International Labour 
Migration and Uneven Regional Development in Labour Export-
ing Countries”, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 77, 
no. 1 (1986): 27–41. 
16 Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, “The New Economics of 
Labor Migration”, American Economic Review 75 (1985): 173–78; 
Douglas S. Massey and Emilio A. Parrado, “International Migra-
tion and Business Formation in Mexico”, Social Science Quarterly 
79, no. 1 (1998): 1–20; J. Edward Taylor, “The New Economics of 
Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration 
Process”, International Migration 37, no. 1 (1999): 63–88. 
17 Kathleen Newland, The Governance of International Migration: 
Mechanisms, Processes and Institutions (Global Commission on Inter-
national Migration, September 2005). 
18 Hein de Haas, “Turning the Tide? Why Development Will Not 
Stop Migration”, Development and Change 38, no. 5 (2007): 819–41; 
Philip L. Martin and J. Edward Taylor, “The Anatomy of a Migra-
tion Hump”, in Development Strategy, Employment, and Migration: 
Insights from Models, ed. J. Edward Taylor (Paris: OECD, Develop-
ment Centre, 1996), 43–62. 
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Most recently signs have appeared of yet another 
turn, now challenging the optimistic migration and 
development paradigms of the past two decades.19 
This critique is based on the observation that the 
positive assessment of migration and development is 
driven by a neoliberal agenda. It argues that recogni-
tion of remittances and diaspora engagement releases 
states from their responsibility for migrants and refu-
gees, and that a positive take on circular migration 
coincides with the interests of rich destination coun-
tries. The risk in both cases is of losing sight of the 
fates of individual migrants, for it is they who ultima-
tely bear the social and economic burdens.20 
The debate over the development impacts of refu-
gee movements is more recent. Traditionally, refugee 
situations have been regarded as temporary emergen-
cies falling under the remit of humanitarian aid. This 
fundamental assumption has also heavily influenced 
the international regime, which has always defined 
the response to refugee movements primarily as a 
humanitarian matter. On the other hand there is an 
obvious need for refugee-related development coopera-
tion: in 2015 89 percent of all refugees and 99 percent 
of all IDPs worldwide were living in developing or 
emerging economies.21 The average duration of refu-
gee situations has also steadily increased.22 Protracted 
refugee situations raise important development-
related questions: How to prevent refugees from be-
coming permanently dependent on aid? Which types 
of support permit recipients to develop perspectives 
for self-reliance? And how to address the development 
 
19 Alan Gamlen, “The New Migration-and-Development Pessi-
mism”, Progress in Human Geography 38, no. 4 (2014): 581–97. 
20 Ester Hernandez and Susan Bibler Coutin, “Remitting Sub-
jects: Migrants, Money and States”, Economy and Society 35, no. 2 
(2006): 185–208; Madeleine Wong, “The Gendered Politics of 
Remittances in Ghanaian Transnational Families”, Economic Geo-
graphy 82, no. 4 (2006): 355–81; Rahel Kunz, “‘Remittances are 
Beautiful’? Gender Implications of the New Global Remittances 
Trend”, Third World Quarterly, 29, no. 7 (2008): 1389–1409; Kavita 
Datta et al., “The New Development Finance or Exploiting 
Migrant Labour? Remittance Sending among Low-paid Migrant 
Workers in London”, International Development Planning Review 29, 
no. 1 (2007): 43–67. 
21 Zara Inga Sarzin, Stocktaking of Global Forced Displacement Data, 
Policy Research Working Paper WPS 7985 (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank Group, 2017) http://documents.worldbank.org/ 
curated/en/788961488290408116/Stocktaking-of-global-forced-
displacement-data. 
22 James Milner, “Protracted Refugee Situations”, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 151–62. 
risks that refugee situations pose for receiving com-
munities? 
Another hotly debated question is how to close the 
gap between humanitarian emergency response and 
longer-term development cooperation in refugee situa-
tions,23 and how to tackle the coordination problems 
between the two policy areas.24 One important aspect 
here is that as time passes, refugees in protracted 
situations are increasingly unlikely to experience any 
of the three traditional solutions: return, resettle-
ment, and local integration. In particular, the coun-
tries receiving large-scale refugee movements are fre-
quently unwilling to grant permanent settlement. In 
such cases receiving states should be encouraged to 
grant at least temporary integration – to offer protec-
tion and at the same time enable refugees to support 
themselves for the duration of their stay through 
access to employment. The question of how to create 
new development instruments and programmes that 
also strengthen the receiving communities is current-
ly under discussion. One priority here is the long-
neglected entrepreneurial potential of refugees.25 
Altogether the academic discourse on migration, 
refugees and development has become more specific 
over the course of time. Five issues form the core of 
the debate. 
Reducing the cost of migration 
The net economic effects of migration are today 
assessed to be overwhelmingly positive, on the basis 
of new empirical findings on financial transfers and 
diaspora relationships. Migrants’ remittances are not 
only worth many times more than official develop-
ment assistance; they have also – unlike foreign direct 
investment – proven astonishingly crisis-resistant.26 
 
23 Jeffrey Crisp, “Mind the Gap! UNHCR, Humanitarian Assis-
tance and the Development Process”, International Migration 
Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 168–91. 
24 For Germany: Lioba Weingärtner et al., Die deutsche humanitäre 
Hilfe im Ausland: Gemeinschaftsevaluierung (Berlin: Bundesministe-
rium für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit and 
Auswärtiges Amt, 2011). 
25 Alexander Betts et al., Refugee Economies: Rethinking Popular 
Assumptions (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of 
Oxford, 2014). 
26 Dilip Ratha, Supriyo De, Sonia Plaza, Kirsten Schuettler, 
William Shaw, Hanspeter Wyss, and Soonhwa Yi, “Migration and 
Remittances – Recent Developments and Outlook”, Migration and 
Development Brief 27, April 2017, (World Bank: Washington, D.C., 
April 2017), http://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-
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A great deal less is known about transfers by refu-
gees.27 But whatever the type of movement, remit-
tances boost savings and investment in countries of 
origin and improve recipients’ credit standing, which 
in turn encourages investment in agriculture and 
setting up small businesses.28 However, transfers to 
LDCs, especially those originating from other develop-
ing countries, frequently incur heavy charges.29 Re-
ducing these costs would considerably boost the devel-
opment impact of remittances. Development actors 
could support this by making it easier for migrants 
and refugees to access normal banks (which usually 
charge lower fees than wire transfer agencies) and 
strengthening competition between different pro-
viders. 
In the case of labour migrants, the costs incurred in 
connection with job search or recruitment also vary 
enormously depending on the migration channel. 
Especially for low-skilled job-seekers, such as domes-
tics and construction workers, visa fees, agency 
charges and travel costs frequently add up to several 
months’ wages. This can create long-term debt and in 
the worst case lead to modern forms of servitude.30 
Countering such risks requires comprehensive regula-
tion of recruitment practices. Promising proposals 
include: always having agency fees paid by the em-
ployer; improving transparency and comparability of 
providers by promoting internet-based recruitment 
platforms; and defining international guidelines for 
good recruitment practices and promoting standard 
employment contracts based on them. Each of these 
proposals requires concomitant monitoring structures 
and complaints mechanisms. Lowering recruitment 
costs is a complex business, but also promises a signifi-
cant development dividend: Every reduction in costs 
 
05/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief27_1.pdf (accessed 22 June 
2017). 
27 Carlos Vargas-Silva, Literature Review: Remittances Sent to and 
from Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, KNOMAD Working 
Paper 12 (Washington, D.C., March 2016), http://www.knomad.org/ 
publication/remittances-sent-and-refugees-and-internally-displaced-
persons-literature-review (accessed 22 June 2017). 
28 John Connell and Richard P.C. Brown, Remittances in the Pacific: 
An Overview (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2005), 33ff. 
29 Dilip Ratha, Leveraging Remittances for Development, Policy Brief 3 
(Washington, D.C., 2007), 11, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015 165/Leveraging 
RemittancesForDevelopment.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017). 
30 Jureidini Ray, Ways Forward in Recruitment of Low-skilled Migrant 
Workers in the Asia-Arab States Corridor (Geneva: International 
Labour Organisation, 2016), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/ 
public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_ 
519913.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017). 
permits migrants to send more money home, where it 
benefits families directly and can create perspectives 
on the ground. 
Diaspora engagement 
Numerous studies now demonstrate that diasporas 
can deepen relations between countries of origin and 
destination and support development processes. They 
also supply micro-credits to those who are otherwise 
excluded from access, contribute to improving infra-
structure, assist knowledge and technology transfer, 
support the acquisition of foreign direct investment, 
and facilitate the recruitment of staff for newly 
founded ventures in countries of origin.31 Yet for all 
the development opportunities, diasporas can also 
present development risks, for example where they are 
instrumentalised in domestic political conflicts in the 
home country and pressured into collecting donations 
or recruiting supporters.32 The same also applies to 
refugees, as demonstrated by many examples of mobi-
lisation and militarisation especially in long-estab-
lished refugee camps.33 Cases have been documented – 
especially in southern Africa – where extremists have 
used their stay to prepare acts of violence in the coun-
try of origin (and sometimes even in the receiving 
country).34 
 
31 Yevgeny Kuznetsov, ed., Diaspora Networks and the International 
Migration of Skills: How Countries Can Draw on Their Talent Abroad, 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006); Kathleen Newland and 
Erin Patrick, Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty 
Reduction in Their Countries of Origin (Washington, D.C.: Migration 
Policy Institute, 2004); Devesh Kapur, “Diasporas and Technology 
Transfer”, Journal of Human Development 2, no. 2 (2001): 265–86; 
OECD, Perspectives on Global Development 2017: International Migration 
in a Shifting World (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016), 205, http://dx. 
doi.org/10. 1787/persp_glob_dev-2017-en (accessed 6 March 
2017). 
32 Robin Cohen, “Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims 
to Challengers”, International Affairs 72, no. 3 (1996): 507–20. 
33 Sarah Kanyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, 
Civil War and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid (London: Cornell 
University Press, 2005); Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds, 
Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 2007); Judith Vorrath, Engaging African 
Diasporas for Peace: Cornerstones for an Emerging EU Agenda, EUISS 
Occasional Paper (Paris: European Union Institute for Security 
Studies, July 2012), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ 
OP_98_Engaging_African_Diasporas.pdf (accessed 6 March 2017). 
34 Juris Pupcenoks, “Migration of Violence”, presentation at 
the 50th Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association, New York, 15 to 18 February 2009 (unpublished 
manuscript). 
Mixed Migration and Development 
SWP Berlin 






Brain drain or “brain gain”? 
Today the possibility of migration causing a brain 
drain is subject to more differentiated assessments. 
Mass emigration of highly qualified young workers 
(especially from the healthcare sector) certainly does 
cause grave difficulties for developing countries. Their 
absence is felt directly in the home labour market, 
while more broadly such an exodus questions the 
usefulness of further state investment in the tertiary 
education sector.35 On the other hand, if remittances 
are invested in education and health this can promote 
the formation of human capital in the country of 
origin.36 And especially in the case of circular migra-
tion there are reasons to hope that the countries of 
origin may eventually profit from the skills and quali-
fications migrants acquire abroad, turning the brain 
drain into a “brain gain”.37 Above and beyond this, 
new approaches also aim to tie the emigration of 
skilled migrants directly to the training of skilled wor-
kers for the respective country of origin. For example 
the Center for Global Development (CGD) proposes 
“transnational training partnerships” to train skilled 
workers for the needs of both the sending and the re-
ceiving country.38 Investing in training in the country 
of origin can contribute to creating internationally 
competitive training institutions. Where such partner-
ships are well designed, both countries of origin and 
countries of destination can profit from skilled labour 
matching their respective labour market needs. This 
would reduce costs, since training can be provided a 
great deal cheaper in countries of origin than in the 
developed world. Such partnerships would ultimately 
also benefit those migrants who later decide to return 
to their home country, with the qualifications ac-
quired abroad improving their chances in the labour 
market there. This effect has already been observed in 
 
35 OECD, Perspectives on Global Development 2017 (see note 31),  
198–201. 
36  Oded Stark, “Rethinking the Brain Drain”, World Development 
32, no. 1 (2004): 15–22. 
37 Jean-Baptiste Meyer, “Network Approach versus Brain Drain: 
Lessons from the Diaspora”, International Migration 39, no. 5 
(2001): 91–110; Anna Lee Saxenian, “From Brain Drain to Brain 
Circulation: Transnational Communities and Regional 
Upgrading in India and China”, Studies in Comparative International 
Development 40, no. 2 (2005): 35–61. 
38 Michael Clemens, “Transnationale Ausbildungspartnerschaf-
ten für Fachkräfte”, in: Migration gerecht gestalten: Weltweite Impulse 
für einen fairen Wettbewerb um Fachkräfte, ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung 
(Gütersloh, 2015), 275–83. 
the context of development-related return pro-
grammes.39 
Refugee movements also often cause brain drain. 
When faced with the threat of persecution, repression 
and civil war it is often the more affluent and better 
educated who flee first, as they tend to be more 
mobile than the rest of the population. Every refugee 
crisis is therefore also associated with a loss of skilled 
workers, which often proves to be irreversible even 
after the situation improves. Especially those whose 
qualifications would enable them to contribute most 
to reconstruction have by then frequently established 
a new life abroad and are no longer considering 
return as an option. 
Protecting the rights of migrants and refugees 
Civil society organisations in particular never tire of 
underlining the central importance of protecting the 
rights of migrants and refugees. The fundamental 
human rights are codified in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (1948), the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (1966). Nevertheless, irregular migrants 
and asylum-seekers frequently experience grave viola-
tions. The Geneva Refugee Convention guarantees 
safeguards for refugees, but for migrants there is a 
gap in the protection afforded by international law. 
In political debate, rights-based and development-
oriented perspectives on migration and forced dis-
placement are often presented as fundamentally op-
posed, with the former foregrounding the situation of 
the individual, while the latter focuses on the overall 
socio-economic development in the country of origin. 
This distinction is false, and unhelpful in practice. In 
fact, protecting the rights of migrants and refugees – 
for example in connection with land rights and access 
to the labour market, or in relation to freedom of 
movement – often represents a precondition for lever-
aging development benefits.40 In order to exploit the 
 
39 Anna Goos, Manual on Circular Migration Scheme (Tbilisi: Public 
Service Development Agency/Center for International Migration 
and Development and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit GmbH, 2016), http://migration.commission.ge/ 
files/pcms_en_final.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017). 
40 Richard Mallett et al., Journeys on Hold: How Policy Influences the 
Migration Decisions of Eritreans in Ethiopia, ODI Working Paper 506 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, February 2017), 
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positive development potential of cross-border move-
ments, protecting fundamental rights alone is not 
enough. Instead an active policy is needed that places 
participation front and centre and opens up opportu-
nities for the individual. 
Return and reintegration 
Return and reintegration represents another impor-
tant and contested set of issues. In destination coun-
tries like Germany, rising numbers of immigrants 
have generated growing political pressure to enforce 
returns, in particular of irregular migrants and reject-
ed asylum-seekers, in order to shore up the legitimacy 
of the official asylum and migration policy. From a 
development perspective it would be warranted to 
consider instead whether the effects of return will 
promote or hinder development. To date there are no 
reliable research findings on the conditions for suc-
cessful state-driven return and repatriation, although 
there is a consensus among researchers that voluntary 
participation improves the chances of successful per-
manent return. There is also agreement that develop-
ment measures accompanying return migration can 
promote reintegration – as long as they go beyond 
pure financial incentives and the often associated 
windfall effects and instead encourage training, self-
reliance and labour market reintegration.41 Forced 
returns without development support on the other 
hand threaten to generate foreign policy and security 
risks. Especially where a government seeks to maxi-
mise the number of returns to an authoritarian re-
gime, there is a danger of it becoming dependent on 
that regime. Strengthening authoritarian regimes 
materially or morally is, however, generally counter-
productive to development. 
Summarising the state of research, it must be noted 
that there is still no general consensus concerning the 
relationships between migration, forced displacement 
 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/ 
11336.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017). 
41 Ruerd Ruben, Marieke Van Houte and Tine Davids, “What 
Determines the Embeddedness of Forced-Return Migrants? 
Rethinking the Role of Pre- and Post-Return Assistance”, Inter-
national Migration Review 43, no. 4 (2009): 908–37; Zachary Whyte 
and Dan V. Hirslund, Assisted Return of Rejected Asylum Seekers – 
How Can We Create Sustainability?, DIIS Policy Brief (Copenhagen: 
Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2013), https:// 
www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/pb2013_ 
assisted_return_of_rejected_asylum_seekers_whyte_webversion. 
pdf (accessed 7 March 2017). 
and development – which comes as no surprise when 
considering the very different normative starting 
points in development research. Pessimists and opti-
mists do agree on a number of points, though: migra-
tion, forced displacement and development are closely 
bound up together; development impacts of popula-
tion movements depend on their political manage-
ment; and creating a positive framework for develop-
ment requires an intense and dependable cooperation 
with partner countries. 
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Structures and Trends in International Cooperation 
 
International cooperation in the field of migration 
and forced displacement is fragmented. While the 
refugee protection regime is firmly anchored in inter-
national law and institutions, migration policy re-
mains a patchwork of regional and bilateral agree-
ments and coordinating mechanisms.42 
Dichotomy: Separate Regimes for Refugees 
and Migration 
The fragmentation of global migration governance has 
historical roots.43 The foundations of the “interna-
tional travel regime” that still exists today was laid in 
the 1920s with the standardisation of travel docu-
ments and visa agreements.44 But it was the aftermath 
of the Second World War that created an urgent need 
for new institutional arrangements, in order to cope 
with the huge movements of displaced persons in 
Europe. 
In this situation two competing designs emerged. 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) volun-
teered to operate as the central agency placing work-
seeking European migrants and refugees seeking to 
settle abroad. The ILO had been working for the rights 
of migrant workers and recognition of their contribu-
tion to development since its establishment in 1919.45 
 
42 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “International Legal Norms on Migra-
tion: Substance Without Architecture”, in International Migration 
Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges, ed. Ryszard Chole-
winski, Euan Macdonald and Richard Perruchoud (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 467–79; Alexander Betts, 
“The Global Governance of Migration and the Role of Trans-
regionalism”, in Multilayered Migration Governance: The Promise of 
Partnership, ed. Rahel Kunz, Sandra Lavenex and Marion Panizzon 
(New York, 2011), 32–42. 
43 Rieko Karatani, “How History Separated Refugee and Migrant 
Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins”, International 
Journal of Refugee Law 17, no. 3 (2005): 517–41. 
44 Rey Koslowski, “Global Mobility and the Quest for an Inter-
national Migration Regime”, Center for Migration Studies Special 
Issues 21, no. 1 (2011): 103–43. 
45 The initial target group was restricted to those displaced 
within Europe following the end of the Second World War. 
The umbrella term chosen by the ILO – “surplus population of 
Europe” – and its focus on finding employment abroad suggests 
that a hard and fast distinction between refugees and migrants 
Under this model the UN would have been responsible 
for protecting the legal rights of all migrants (includ-
ing refugees). But certain major donor governments – 
first and foremost the USA – were concerned that this 
approach could water down state sovereignty over 
migration matters, and the ILO proposal was rejected. 
Instead a binary structure was created in 1950 and 
1951. On the one side, the UN refugee agency UNHCR 
emerged, with an initial three-year mandate that has 
been successively extended ever since. On the other, 
the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the 
Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) – the 
precursor of today’s International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) was established.46 The Geneva Refugee 
Convention of 1951 granted UNHCR an international 
mandate to protect refugees, while PICMME was set up 
largely to help states cope with the logistical challeng-
es related to huge migratory movements and was 
designed intentionally without a normative mandate, 
as an intergovernmental organisation outside the UN 
framework.47 
This created the basis for a separation of interna-
tional structures for migrants and refugees that essen-
tially persists to this day, with clear differences in 
their legal foundations, their funding, their methods 
and the participating actors. From the outset the 
 
was not being made at this juncture. Katy Long, “When Refu-
gees Stopped Being Migrants: Movement, Labour and Humani-
tarian Protection”, Migration Studies 1, no. 1 (2013): 4–26. 
46 The work of both organisations was initially restricted to 
Europe. That changed for UNHCR in 1967 with the Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Refugee Convention, which lifted the 
geographical and temporal restrictions contained in the original 
text. In the case of PICMME (Intergovernmental Committee for 
European Migration [ICEM] from 1952), its renaming in 1980 to 
Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) marked the 
end of its exclusive focus on Europe. It became IOM in 1989. 
Richard Perruchoud, “From the Intergovernmental Committee 
for European Migration to the International Organization for 
Migration”, International Journal of Refugee Law 1, no. 4 (1989):  
501–17. 
47 Fabian Georgi, “For the Benefit of Some: The International 
Organization for Migration and Its Global Migration Manage-
ment”, in The Politics of International Migration Management, ed. 
Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud (Basingstoke, 2010), 45–72, 
analyses the political background and historical development of 
PICMME/IOM. 
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Geneva Refugee Convention gave UNHCR a clear 
humanitarian mandate to represent the interests of 
asylum-seekers and recognised refugees vis-à-vis the 
governments of the receiving countries. Every year 
UNHCR calculates its probable funding requirements 
for the coming year and on that basis requests volun-
tary contributions from the member states. While this 
creates a fundamental dependency on the financial 
contributions of the donors, UNHCR possesses con-
siderable scope to set its own priorities for operations 
and activities.48 
UNHCR’s work with refugees in developing coun-
tries and crisis regions is driven by the humanitarian 
identity of the organisation, often concentrating on 
initially short-term support in the context of large 
camps.49 This approach focussing on “care and main-
tenance” often draws criticism from the development 
community for failing to offer longer-term perspec-
tives and often leading to years of “warehousing” in 
camps instead.50 UNHCR has long been seeking to 
bridge the gap between emergency humanitarian aid 
and longer-term development cooperation.51 In many 
donor countries this topic continues to define the 
development debate about emergency aid.52 
Whereas the experience of the Second World War 
led to far-reaching multilateral commitments on 
refugee protection, agreements in the area of migra-
tion were largely restricted to the bilateral level. The 
main obstacle to further-reaching international coop-
eration on labour migration was then – and remains 
now – the absence of incentives for prosperous desti-
nation countries to submit to global governance 
structures. Instead they can recruit bilaterally from 
the global oversupply of low-skilled labour as demand 
requires, without having to commit themselves to 
keeping their borders open when the economic situa-
tion deteriorates.53 
 
48 Gil Loescher, “The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests 
vs. Institutional Autonomy”, International Migration Review 35, 
no. 1 (2001): 33–56. 
49 Michel Agier, Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and 
Humanitarian Government (Cambridge, 2011). 
50 Merrill Smith, “Warehousing Refugees”, World Refugee Survey 
38 (2004): 38–56. 
51 Crisp, “Mind the Gap!” (see note 23). 
52 For Germany: Auswärtiges Amt and Bundesministerium für 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, Leitfaden zur 
Erläuterung der Aufgaben des Auswärtigen Amts (AA) und des Bundes-
ministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) 
in den Bereichen der Humanitären Hilfe und der Entwicklungsfördernden 
strukturbildenden Übergangshilfe (Berlin, 2014). 
53 Aristide R. Zolberg, “Labour Migration and International 
Unlike UNHCR, the mandates of the IOM precursors 
PICMME, ICEM and ICM were therefore purely techni-
cal, concentrating on measures implementing the 
migration plans of member states: the logistics of 
migrant registration, medical tests and transport. To 
this day IOM is primarily a service provider for its 
donor countries, which it supports in pursuing their 
own migration interests. While fundamental human 
rights naturally also apply to migrants,54 IOM does 
not possess a mandate to oversee and encourage their 
observance. It therefore possesses no power to tell 
states what kind of migration policy they should 
pursue. 
While IOM acquired a central logistical support role 
for migratory movements, the ILO ceased to play any 
operational part in migration management after the 
rejection of its proposal for a joint refugee and migra-
tion regime. It now concentrated instead on strength-
ening the rights of migrant workers. The two central 
legal instruments in this area are ILO Conventions 
No. 97 (Migration for Employment Convention, 1949) 
and No. 143 (Convention Concerning Migrations in 
Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality 
of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, 
1975). The former contains provisions concerning ex-
 
Economic Regimes: Bretton Woods and After”, in International 
Migration Systems: A Global Approach, ed. Mary M. Kritz, Lin Lean 
Lim and Hania Zlotnik (Oxford, 1992), 315–34; Koslowski, 
“Global Mobility and the Quest for an International Migration 
Regime” (see note 44). 
54 As well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 
the relevant norms include the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Stateless Persons (1954), the Convention for the Suppression 
of Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of 
Others (1949), the International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families 
(1990), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1965). The applicable rights include the 
right to life, protection against torture, rights in criminal pro-
ceedings, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the 
right to family life. The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 lists further rights applicable 
to all regardless of citizenship: the right to work (“the right of 
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which 
he freely chooses or accepts”), the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work, the right to social security, the right to an 
adequate standard of living, the right to health, and the right to 
education. The prohibition on discrimination fundamentally 
applies to migrants and citizens alike. But there are exceptions: 
for example under the International Covenant on Civil and Poli-
tical Rights certain types of unequal treatment are permissible 
in pursuit of listed legitimate objectives such as ensuring public 
order. 
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change of information between states, support and 
information for migrants, and rules on healthcare 
and anti-discrimination. The latter supplements these 
provisions and commits countries of destination to 
protect migrants’ human rights. Even though their 
provisions are couched in very general terms, the 
conventions have to date been signed by only a hand-
ful of industrialised countries.55 The same applies to 
the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (1990), which has yet to be signed by any 
major industrialised country. 
The ILO’s record on migration-related norm-setting 
is therefore sobering, and some critics place the blame 
not on governments but within the organisation it-
self.56 Nonetheless, its tripartite structure gives the ILO 
an inherent potential to make important contribu-
tions to future global migration governance through 
trialogue between representatives of governments, 
workers and employers. 
In essence, the international institutional frame-
work for refugees and migration that emerged in post-
war Europe sought primarily to provide humanitarian 
assistance to refugees while preserving state sover-
eignty over migration. But large numbers of asylum-
seekers, growing labour mobility and rising demand 
for labour – especially in Europe – generated a grow-
ing need for additional migration management instru-
ments. By the early 1990s the discourse had changed 
and new forms of supranational cooperation were 
emerging. 
Adjustment Processes in Migration Policy: 
Regional and Global Cooperation 
The international migration debate really got rolling 
in the course of the 1990s, with the number of par-
ticipating actors increasing significantly. Regional 
 
55 By October 2016 ILO Convention no. 97 had been ratified by 
forty-nine states (including ten industrialised countries), ILO 
Convention no. 143 by twenty-three (including five industrial-
ised countries). Their marginal status is reflected in their omis-
sion from the ILO’s own list of the eight central conventions that 
guide its work. ILO, Conventions and Recommendations (2016), http:// 
www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-
labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/ 
index.htm (accessed 7 March 2017). 
56 Virginia Leary, “Labour Migration”, in Migration and Inter-
national Legal Norms, ed. T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Vincent 
Chetail (The Hague, 2003), 228–39. 
cooperation processes grew in importance,57 and in 
1994 the UN International Conference on Population 
and Development in Cairo laid down the first markers 
for closer cooperation on migration at the global 
level.58 These intergovernmental processes were ac-
companied by a growing involvement of NGOs and 
private-sector actors in shaping global migration 
policy and action.59 
Regionalisation of cooperation: Integration 
processes, networks and interregional cooperation 
Regional migration cooperation takes place in three 
different formats. Firstly, in the scope of regional 
integration processes, governments seek to move 
towards regional freedom of movement and joint 
stances vis-à-vis third states; secondly they participate 
in informal regional consultative processes (RCPs); 
and thirdly they engage in interregional cooperation 
processes.60 
Regional integration processes 
One early example of cooperation in a context of 
regional integration processes is the European Union’s 
efforts to institute freedom of movement within its 
borders. Free movement of workers was already a 
stated objective of the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The 
privilege has been gradually expanded to include 
other groups, and today represents a crucial aspect of 
the EU citizenship introduced in 1992. Since then, 
a complex – and in certain respects still inadequate – 
system of EU directives and regulations has sprung up 
to regulate cooperation in refugee and migration 
policy.61 Here too, cooperation on asylum matters is 
much more comprehensively regulated than migra-
tion. 
 
57 Colleen Thouez and Frédérique Channac, “Shaping Inter-
national Migration Policy: The Role of Regional Consultative 
Processes”, West European Politics 29, no. 2 (2006): 370–87. 
58 Newland, Governance of International Migration (see note 17). 
59 The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International 
Migration, ed. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg 
Sørensen (New York, 2013). 
60 Sandra Lavenex et al., “Regional Migration Governance”, 
in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, ed. Tanja A. 
Börzel and Thomas Risse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
457–85. 
61 Kees Groenendijk, “Recent Developments in EU Law on 
Migration: The Legislative Patchwork and the Court’s Approach”, 
European Journal of Migration and Law 16, no. 3 (2014): 313–35. 
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The dismantling of Europe’s internal borders and 
the increasing importance of the common external 
borders have stimulated a growing willingness to 
cooperate in external asylum and migration policy. 
This external dimension frequently draws criticism for 
instrumentalising development cooperation to control 
migratory movements. Ideas as to how migration 
could be used to promote development are present in 
the concepts, critics note, but they play little role in 
political practice. 
Countries in Asia, Latin America, North America 
and Africa have in recent decades also undertaken 
numerous attempts to channel cooperation on migra-
tion and freedom of movement in the context of 
regional integration groupings. Examples include 
the then Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
with its 1996 Conference on Refugees and Migrants; 
ASEAN’s Declaration on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Rights of Migrant Workers in 2007;62 and the 
South American Common Market with the MERCOSUR 
Residence Agreement of 2002 relating to freedom of 
movement, and ongoing debates on a South American 
citizenship.63 African states have discussed asylum 
and migration issues in frameworks including the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC).64 
Here the focus of interest has been freedom of move-
ment. The African Union has also been active in this 
area since 2002, continuing the efforts of its predeces-
sor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). African 
regional organisations have played a pioneering role 
in the area of refugee rights. The definition of the 
term “refugee” in the OAU Refugee Convention of 
1969 – unlike the Geneva Refugee Convention –
includes those who have left their home country 
because of “external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public 
 
62 Gloria O. Pasadilla, Social Security and Labor Migration in ASEAN, 
Research Policy Brief 34 (Tokyo: Asian Development Bank 
Institute, 2011). 
63 Diego Acosta, Free Movement in South America: The Emergence 
of an Alternative Model? (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy 
Institute, 23 August 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
article/free-movement-south-america-emergence-alternative-
model (accessed 7 March 2017). 
64 Regionale Migrationspolitik auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent: 
Aktuelle Situation und Zukunftsperspektiven, sef-Studie (Bonn: 
Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, October 2016), http://www. 
sef-bonn.org/fileadmin/Die_SEF/Publikationen/SB/sb_studie-
2016_de.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017). 
order”.65 The African Union’s Kampala Convention, 
which came into force in 2012, is the first regional 
legal instrument to require the protection of inter-
nally displaced persons. In practice, however, partici-
pating states fail to live up to these commitments. 
Regional networks 
The second form of regional migration cooperation 
takes place via informal intergovernmental dialogues 
in the guise of regional consultation processes (RCPs). 
One early example is the Budapest Process, which was 
established in 1991 in the context of the spike in east-
west movements following the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
It was driven by a realisation on the part of the Euro-
pean Union that close cooperation with its Eastern 
neighbours would be vital in coping with the ensuing 
challenges.66 This cooperation was then gradually 
extended to the countries of the Black Sea region and 
finally to Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Since the mid-1990s such regional consultation 
processes have emerged in almost all parts of the 
world at the initiative of individual states or inter-
national organisations; there are currently eighteen 
active RCPs and four inactive ones. Their principal 
activities are intergovernmental information ex-
change and discussion of refugee- and migration-
related challenges. UNHCR and IOM participate in 
these processes, with IOM providing secretariat func-
tions to more than half of all RCPs, allowing it to in-
fluence the agenda of their consultations. The advan-
tage of RCPs over other forms of cooperation is that 
they function largely informally, without a cumber-
some apparatus, and are flexible in their agendas and 
timeframes.67 Often, however, not least because of 
their informal and intergovernmental nature, such 
consultation processes focus on security aspects and 
questions of border management and the repatriation 
of rejected asylum-seekers. Aid organisations often 
criticise a lack of transparency on the part of the par-
ticipating governments and regard these processes as 
drivers of restrictive asylum and migration policies.68 
 
65 Article 1.2 of the 1968 OAU Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, http://www. 
achpr.org/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr_instr_ 
conv_refug_eng.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017). 
66 International Centre for Migration Policy Development 
(ICMPD), 20+ Years of the Budapest Process: An Analysis of Over Two 
Decades of Migration Dialogue (Budapest, 2013). 
67 Thouez and Channac, “Shaping International Migration 
Policy” (see note 57). 
68 Lavenex et al., “Regional Migration Governance” (see note 60), 
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As well as these regional forms of cooperation, there 
are also a series of interregional forums, especially in 
connection with refugee- and migration-specific agree-
ments between European and African states. One 
example of these are the EU’s mobility partnerships, 
which aim to bring together labour market, foreign 
policy, security and development aspects in such a 
way as to benefit all involved. In reality the mobility 
partnerships concluded since 2006 (with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cape Verde, Georgia, Jordan, 
Moldova, Morocco, and Tunisia) have failed to fulfil 
these expectations. Although the partnerships have 
promoted dialogue on migration and the establish-
ment of refugee- and migration-related capacities 
in partner states – and in some cases also realised 
smaller-scale pilot projects on labour migration – 
they have not as yet been used to agree major migra-
tion programmes which constitutes the key priority 
for most partner countries. 
In practice the existing partnerships still often 
concentrate one-sidedly on reducing irregular migra-
tion.69 This approach ignores the opportunity to 
achieve the widely discussed “triple win” of enabling 
and shaping labour migration in such a way that the 
individuals involved, the countries of origin and the 
destination countries all benefit.70 This leaves the 
development-promoting potential of migration un-
tapped, and instead places a growing burden on coun-
tries of origin where legal migration options remain 
absent. This applies above all to countries with a large 
youth bulge, where the younger generation finds it 
especially hard to establish a livelihood.71 
Human rights organisations express similar criti-
cisms of the newest instrument in the external dimen-
sion of EU migration policy, the so-called migration 
partnerships or compacts. This strategy, proposed 
in June 2016 by the European Commission, seeks to 
 
457–85; Geiger and Pécoud, eds. The Politics of International Migra-
tion Management (see note 47). 
69 Sergio Carrera and R. Hernández i Sagrera, “Mobility Partner-
ships: ‘Insecurity Partnerships’ for Policy Coherence and Migrant 
Workers’ Human Rights in the EU”, in Multilayered Migration 
Governance, ed. Kunz et al. (see note 42), 97–115. 
70 Steffen Angenendt, Triple-Win Migration: Challenges and Oppor-
tunities, German Marshall Fund/Robert Bosch Stiftung Migration 
Strategy Group on Global Competitiveness Framework Paper 
(Berlin, April 2014). 
71 Steffen Angenendt and Silvia Popp, Jugendüberhang: Entwick-
lungspolitische Risiken, Chancen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten, SWP-
Studie 12/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 
2013). 
encourage African and Arab countries of origin and 
transit countries along the most important current 
routes to cooperate more closely with the EU. What 
the Commission is seeking is cooperation in fighting 
the causes of forced displacement. Critics see this as a 
means to stop irregular movements and encourage 
partner states to take back citizens who have entered 
the European Union by irregular channels. This is, 
they say, also clearly reflected in the processes initi-
ated by the EU to strengthen migration cooperation 
with African states – above all in connection with the 
Rabat Process with West African states and the Khar-
toum Process with the states along the migration 
routes originating in the Horn of Africa.72 
The EU migration partnerships provide for closer 
administrative cooperation, financial aid and techni-
cal support for African and Arab countries to create 
incentives to stem irregular migration. The tools also 
encompass trade agreements and visa liberalisation 
programmes: States that refuse to cooperate must 
expect trade agreements to be suspended and develop-
ment cooperation funding cut. Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, and Senegal are the first selected partner 
countries; an expansion of the scheme to further 
countries is under discussion.73 
Developments at the global level 
While cooperation on refugee- and migration-related 
questions was firmly on the agenda by the early 1990s, 
change lagged at the global level. Institutional rivalry 
between UNHCR and IOM sharpened during the 
1990s, with UNHCR coming under increasing pres-
sure. It faced enormous practical challenges in protect-
ing and caring for refugees, while at the same time 
finding itself confronted with demands from states 
wishing to see refugee numbers reduced. In addition, 
difficult new challenges were emerging for UNHCR, 
above all in connection with the increase in protract-
ed refugee crises and the rising numbers of internally 
displaced persons – for whom UNHCR is not strictly 
speaking responsible but has become increasingly in-
 
72 Stephan Dünnwald et al., Aus den Augen, aus dem Sinn: Externa-
lisierung und Regionalisierung von Migrations- und Flüchtlingspolitik 
(Berlin: Brot für die Welt, June 2016). 
73 European Commission, Factsheet on Migration Partnership Frame-
work, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_ 
migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf (accessed 
7 March 2017). 
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volved at the request of states.74 Within UNHCR a para-
digm shift emerged during this phase, with growing 
criticism of the perception of refugees as helpless 
victims and passive recipients of aid. Now there were 
increasing calls to take account of their entrepre-
neurial potential and enable them to find independ-
ent livelihoods and perspectives outside the camps.75 
In practice, however, such objectives were realised 
only occasionally. 
At the same time the previously much smaller IOM 
expanded massively, with the tally of member states 
rising from 38 in 1990 to 165 in 2016. Today IOM 
employs more than nine thousand staff in 480 offices 
around the globe. This rapid expansion was driven by 
strong state demand for IOM services relating primarily 
to the return of irregular migrants, the reintegration 
of returnees and the enhancement of border security. 
This orientation has drawn repeated criticism from 
human rights organisations, alleging that it prioritises 
the interests of its donors over those of migrants in 
contradiction to its own motto (“managing migration 
for the benefit of all”).76 IOM has also pursued expan-
sion beyond the areas described above, leading to 
overlap with the activities of UNHCR.77 
Beyond these two central actors, the Programme of 
Action adopted in 1994 by the Cairo UN International 
Conference on Population and Development marked 
the beginning of a slow turn to more international 
cooperation by the international community.78 A 
series of important changes occurred around the turn 
of the century, both within and outside the United 
Nations. The UN Commission on Human Rights ap-
pointed a Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
 
74 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998 repre-
sented a significant normative advance in this area: http://www. 
unhcr.org/protection/idps/43ce1cff2/guiding-principles-internal-
displacement.html (accessed 7 March 2017). 
75 Alexander Betts and Naohiko Omata, Humanitarian Innovation 
and Refugee Protection (University of Oxford: Refugee Studies 
Centre, 2012). 
76 IOM, Managing Migration for the Benefit of All: The International 
Organization for Migration in Brief (Geneva, 2014). Ishan Ashutosh 
and Alison Mountz, “Migration Management for the Benefit of 
Whom? Interrogating the Work of the International Organiza-
tion for Migration”, Citizenship Studies 15, no. 1 (2011): 21–38. 
77 Anne Koch, “The Politics and Discourse of Migrant Return: 
The Role of UNHCR and IOM in the Governance of Return”, 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40, no. 6 (2014): 905–23. 
78 “International Migration”, in United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA), Programme of Action of the International Conference 
on Population and Development (2014), http://www.unfpa.org/ 
publications/international-conference-population-and-
development-programme-action (accessed 7 March 2017). 
Migrants, the ILO made migration the focus of its 2004 
conference, and the WTO’s Doha Round took up the 
issue of trade in services. Around the same time, the 
World Bank and numerous regional development 
banks recognised the significance of remittances for 
development and intensified their research activities 
in that sphere. Two consultative processes outside the 
UN structures spurred developments. In the context 
of the Hague Process launched in 1999, civil society 
actors discussed the opportunities and potentials of 
migratory movements. The Berne Initiative, which ran 
from 2001 to 2004, offered the first forum for govern-
ments from all over the world to discuss the challeng-
es associated with migration and its management. 
In the course of these debates the Global Commis-
sion on International Migration (GCIM) was estab-
lished in 2003 at the initiative of the UN Secretary-
General. Within the space of two years it conducted a 
stocktaking of migration problems and structures; its 
final report in 2005 contained recommendations for 
strengthening global migration governance. Three 
concrete outcomes implemented in 2006 were the 
appointment of a UN Special Representative for Inter-
national Migration, the convening of the first UN 
High-level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development, and the founding of the Global Migra-
tion Group (GMG). The remit of the GMG is to promote 
closer cooperation between UN agencies dealing with 
migration issues and foster a deeper problem-driven 
exchange on migration questions between them.79 
The consolidation of contacts in working groups has 
transpired to be advantageous, as these provide a 
forum for expert discussion and sharing of informa-
tion about plans and projects. One drawback of the 
GMG is that the issues addressed depend strongly on 
the chair, which rotates annually regardless of how 
intensely the respective agency is involved in refugee 
and migration questions. In recent years the chairing 
agencies have often set the agenda according to their 
own needs and interests, rather than to those aspects 
of greatest importance to the membership as a whole. 
One consequence of this is that the outcomes (in the 
form of joint reports) have not generated the levels 
of public and political interest that would have been 
achievable given more focussed planning. Opportu-
 
79 Antoine Pécoud, “‘Suddenly, Migration Was Everywhere’: 
The Conception and Future Prospects of the Global Migration 
Group”, Migration Information Source online journal, 5 February 
2013, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/suddenly-
migration-was-everywhere-conception-and-future-prospects-
global-migration-group (accessed 7 March 2017). 
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nities have been wasted here, especially with respect 
to the practical aspects of migration cooperation. 
At the global level, the Global Forum on Migration 
and Development (GFMD) founded in 2007 has grown 
into the central discussion format for migration and 
development issues. It came into being at the initiative 
of the then UN Special Representative for Interna-
tional Migration, Peter Sutherland. As a multilateral 
forum, it allows the participating states to informally 
exchange experience on best practices and capacity-
building and to find inspiration for bilateral coopera-
tion. But its specific organisational form as an inter-
governmental process means that non-state actors 
(such as the business sector and trade unions) initially 
only played a marginal role in the GFMD. This has 
changed over the years and has gone hand in hand 
with a broadening of the thematic scope of the forum, 
which now includes previously excluded issues like 
the human rights of migrants and return and reinte-
gration. The future organisational shape of the GFMD, 
its function and its orientation were addressed by the 
second High Level Dialogue in October 2013, which 
found a broad consensus behind strengthening the 
GFMD process. Also in 2013, the Global Knowledge 
Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) 
was founded under the auspices of the World Bank, 
initially to run for five years. This research initiative, 
funded largely by Germany and Switzerland and struc-
tured into thematic working groups, is dedicated to 
knowledge exchange in the area of migration and 
development. 
Beneficiaries and power shifts 
Non-state actors play an important role in refugee and 
migration policy and action, and migration manage-
ment is a growth sector from which various entities 
profit. On the one side, the interaction of increasing 
cross-border movements and state efforts to manage it 
boosts demand for control technologies and migra-
tion-related support services. The financial volume of 
both sectors has grown strongly since the 1990s and 
the spectrum is correspondingly diverse.80 Trans-
national corporations like Boeing, G4S and Hallibur-
ton supply technologies and services for border secu-
rity, while law firms and private agencies offer legal 
and practical assistance for legal immigration – and 
 
80 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen, eds., The Migration Industry 
(see note 59). 
trafficking organisations operate the illegal routes. 
The expansion in this branch is not restricted to the 
private sector, with international agencies taking 
related commissions from states. Above all the rapid 
growth of the IOM and the International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in the past two 
decades illustrates the growing demand for migration-
related goods and services. This commercialisation of 
migration influences the options available to states, 
yet since it is driven by economic interests it frequent-
ly runs counter to development objectives. Certain 
states have also found ways to profit from growing 
demands for control of migration: witness the ex-
panded negotiating power vis-à-vis Europe enjoyed 
by the governments of Turkey and various North 
African countries (such as Egypt and Tunisia). Prom-
ises to prevent irregular movements of migrants and 
refugees to Europe (and threats to cease doing so) crop 
up with increasing frequency in negotiations over 
bilateral assistance. 
Current Trend: Consolidating International 
Cooperation 
Cooperation on refugee and migration questions, 
which had hitherto developed incrementally, experi-
enced a sudden boost in 2015/2016, as reflected in the 
growth of relevant processes and forums. 
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted 
unanimously by the UN General Assembly in Septem-
ber 2015 follow the principle of “leaving no one be-
hind” and as such are relevant in their entirety for 
migration and refugee issues. This represents a clear 
advance over the Millennium Development Goals, 
which neglected the situation of marginalised groups 
to which many refugees and migrants belong.81 
At various points the SDGs also refer directly to 
the connection between migration and development. 
Target 10.7 is central: as part of the goal of reducing 
global inequality, it calls on the international commu-
nity to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migra-
tion”. Target 8.8 addresses labour rights and safe and 
secure working conditions for all, explicitly “includ-
ing migrant workers”. Target 10.c calls for the trans-
action costs of remittances to be reduced to less than 
 
81 UNGA Report A/69/302, 4, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/ 
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/501/96/PDF/N1450196.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed 10 March 2017). 
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3 percent.82 In many areas, however, there is still a 
lack of meaningful indicators for assessing progress 
made by individual countries.83 If migration is to be 
granted practical relevance in the post-2030 agenda, 
further efforts need to be made. 
The surge of refugees into the EU in 2015 put the 
topic of migration in the headlines for months. It be-
came obvious that international migration and refugee 
cooperation was in many respects inadequate. In this 
situation two international summits were convened: 
the United Nations General Assembly high-level 
meeting on addressing large movements of refugees 
and migrants on 19 September 2016 (the United 
Nations Summit) and US President Barack Obama’s 
Leaders’ Summit the next day.84 
The UN Summit represented the General Assem-
bly’s first discussion of this set of issues, fulfilling a 
demand raised repeatedly since the Cairo Interna-
tional Conference on Population and Development of 
1994. The Summit ended with the unanimous adop-
tion of the New York Declaration,85 dedicated to the 
shared challenges of migration and forced displace-
ment and already regarded as a milestone in inter-
national migration policy. In it, states commit to the 
human rights and protection of all migrants and 
forcibly displaced persons, regardless of their legal or 
immigration status. With respect to the latter, the 
Declaration calls for more support for countries re-
ceiving large numbers of refugees and for global 
burden-sharing in major refugee crises. In relation to 
migrants it underlines the rights of those who do not 
 
82 As well as these three explicitly migration-related targets, a 
string of other goals are implicitly relevant. One example would 
be target 16.9, to “provide legal identity for all, including birth 
registration”, which addresses a central issue of internal dis-
placement and statelessness. The fulfilment of the post-2030 
Agenda would therefore also eliminate many of the current 
reasons for involuntary migration. 
83 UNSTATS, Tier Classification for Global SDG Indicators (21 Sep-
tember 2016), http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/meetings/iaeg-sdgs-
meeting-04/Tier%20Classification%20of%20SDG%20Indicators% 
20Updated%2023-09-16.pdf (accessed 7 March 2017). 
84 At the Summit participating states made concrete promises 
concerning resettlement, access to education, and access to 
the labour market. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Fact Sheet on the Leaders’ Summit on Refugees (20 September 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/ 
09/20/fact-sheet-leaders-summit-refugees (accessed 7 March 
2017). 
85 UN General Assembly, Seventy-first Session, “New York 
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants”, (13 September 2016), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/L.1 
(accessed 7 March 2017). 
fall under the criteria of the Geneva Refugee Conven-
tion but have nevertheless been forced to leave their 
home country or require protection after leaving 
voluntarily. In this sense the New York Declaration 
is relevant to the phenomenon of mixed migrations 
described above, and the associated deficits. The Decla-
ration does however contain a serious deficit of its 
own, in that its declarations of intent exclude the 
large category of internally displaced persons. 
It is nevertheless a step forward, because it opens 
up opportunities to further strengthen international 
cooperation on questions related to migration and 
forced displacement. In particular, states resolved to 
negotiate two new agreements: The Global Refugee 
Compact will be drafted under the auspices of UNHCR 
and seeks to improve international responsibility-
sharing in the area of refugee protection.86 The con-
tent of the planned Global Migration Compact is still 
largely open, pending a broad consultation process. 
Finalisation of both agreements is scheduled for late 
2018. So the UN Summit of 2016 marked the starting 
shot for two years of negotiations, giving new actors 
an opportunity to contribute to the future architec-
ture of global migration governance. 
The UN Summit also provided the opportunity to 
complete another fundamental change to the inter-
national migration regime: at the meeting the IOM 
was officially admitted into the UN family. This step 
had been repeatedly discussed in the preceding years, 
and had been promoted by developing countries in 
particular. Important donor countries and the IOM 
itself responded cautiously to the proposal, because 
closer integration into the UN threatened to call into 
question the organisation’s flexibility and service-
oriented identity, which the main donors valued. It 
was the adoption of the migration-relevant Sustaina-
ble Development Goals that tipped the balance, as 
without UN membership IOM would have been ex-
cluded from the process of preparing indicators and 
implementing and monitoring the Goals. The chosen 
form of a “related agency” (comparable with the status 
of the WTO) only apparently resolves this dilemma 
however: inclusion in the UN offers the IOM access to 
central processes of international migration policy, 
but its mandate and structure remain unaffected. 
 
86 Annex I of the New York Declaration, 17–22, http://www.un. 
org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/L.1 (accessed 7 March 
2017). 
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From a rights-based perspective this represents a 
missed opportunity.87 The New York Declaration 
underlines the non-normative identity of IOM and 
completely avoids impinging on its independence, for 
example not imposing any reporting duties. The rea-
son for this failure to connect full rights to participate 
in UN processes with a normative mandate is to be 
found in the interests of the IOM’s main donors. Ulti-
mately the conceptual and operational hole in the 
international migration regime remains, and IOM’s 
biggest deficit from the development perspective is 
perpetuated.88 
The ambitious plan to negotiate a new and com-
prehensive migration agreement at the highest level 
of the UN was preceded by a series of initiatives and 
consultation processes. These aimed to improve pro-
tection and support for those who fall outside the 
Geneva Refugee Convention, and to bring about dura-
ble solutions for refugees. The Ten-Point Plan of Action 
on Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration presented 
by UNHCR in 2006 formulated the first concrete and 
rights-based recommendations for dealing with mixed 
migratory movements. The Nansen Initiative initiated 
in 2012 by Switzerland and Norway held regional 
consultations to prepare new standards of protection 
for people forced to leave their homes due to natural 
disaster or climate change. In October 2015 these con-
sultations produced the Agenda for the Protection 
of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of 
Disasters and Climate Change (Protection Agenda), 
endorsed by 109 governments. Its implementation is 
 
87 Nicholas R. Micinski and Thomas G. Weiss, International 
Organization for Migration and the UN System: A Missed Opportunity, 
Future United Nations Development System Briefing 42 (New 
York, September 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2841067 (accessed 7 March 2017). 
88 The preservation of the organisation’s non-normative char-
acter is emblematic of the persistent and strong reservations 
against binding obligations in the sphere of migration. The UN 
“treaty event”, where states were encouraged to sign interna-
tional treaties and conventions (and to address existing reserva-
tions), was held in 2016 in parallel to the UN Summit and ex-
plicitly highlighted mobility in its title: “Towards the Promotion 
of the International Legal Framework on Human Mobility”. But 
out of the seventy-nine accessions and ratifications only two 
were directly related to the migration/refugee complex, namely 
Guinea-Bissau’s accession to the 1954 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness. United Nations, 2016 Treaty Event: 
Towards the Promotion of the International Legal Framework on Human 
Mobility: Final Report (19–23 September 2016), https://treaties.un. 
org/doc/source/events/2016/final_report-2016.pdf (accessed 
7 March 2017). 
now being advanced by a follow-up initiative, the 
Platform on Disaster Displacement. The Migrants in 
Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC), founded in 2014 
with a secretariat located within IOM, is developing 
“non-binding, voluntary principles, guidelines and 
effective practices for States and other stakeholders to 
better prepare for, respond to, and address the longer-
term consequences of migrants caught in countries 
experiencing conflicts or natural disasters”. The Solu-
tions Alliance was also founded in 2014, with a secre-
tariat at the Danish Refugee Council, to bring together 
humanitarian and development actors to prepare sus-
tainable solutions for protracted refugee situations. 
Alongside these specifically refugee- and migration-
related processes, the issues are increasingly percolat-
ing into other policy areas too. For example, the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda (4A) adopted at the Third Inter-
national Conference on Financing for Development in 
July 2015 contains explicit migration-related targets. 
The Paris climate agreement of 12 December 2015 
named protecting the rights of migrants as a central 
challenge and called for the establishment of a Task 
Force on Displacement. The World Humanitarian 
Summit in June 2016 addressed questions of displace-
ment and asylum, while migration and forced dis-
placement are also on the agenda of the G20 summit 
in summer 2017 and the International Labour Con-
ference 2017 features labour migration as a priority.89 
More broadly, the European Commission maintains an 
ongoing interest in the issues, currently focussing on 
border security. It remains questionable whether the 
interplay and cross-connections between these differ-
ent areas will lead to a further consolidation of the 
international migration regime – or instead to its frag-
mentation. It also remains open which of the perspec-
tives – development, trade, economy, human rights 
or security – will rise to the top and come to define 
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The Deficits of International Migration Cooperation 
 
The existing international migration regime suffers a 
string of structural deficits that are particularly prob-
lematic from a development perspective. These in-
clude institutional fragmentation, a structural power 
imbalance between countries of origin and countries 
of destination, and a lack of normative standards. 
These deficits are interconnected – not separate – 
problems. The improvement of global migration 
governance is further hindered by the fact that many 
other policy areas influence the dynamics of cross-
border movements. 
Institutional Fragmentation 
As the preceding overview demonstrates, internation-
al migration cooperation operates within a multitude 
of parallel and overlapping institutions and consulta-
tive forums. While this existence of parallel member-
ships and mandates grants states flexibility in ad-
dressing individual migration-related challenges, it 
makes it harder to develop comprehensive solutions 
at the regional and global level.90 Instead of supplying 
a clear framework for intergovernmental negotia-
tions, this structure encourages “venue-shopping” in 
the sense that states are free to choose the institution-
al context that offers the best prospects of achieving 
one’s own political objectives.91 Governments of afflu-
ent destination countries are particularly prone to 
pursue this strategy, seeking to tighten their control 
over migratory movements.92 In practice this frequent-
ly leads to short-term security objectives overshadow-
ing longer-term (and more sustainable) development 
perspectives. This is the principal reason for the global 
lack of coherent migration agendas that are coordi-
nated between the various relevant institutions. 
 
90 Lavenex, “Regional Migration Governance” (see note 60), 457. 
91 The term “venue-shopping” was coined by Frank R. Baum-
gartner and Bryan D. Jones, in Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993). 
92 Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration 
Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 38, no. 2 (2000): 251–71; Sandra Lavenex, 
“Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigra-
tion Control”, West European Politics 29, no. 2 (2006): 329–50. 
Persistent Imbalance of Power 
The institutional fragmentation of migration coopera-
tion reflects both the incremental evolution of gover-
nance structures and the imbalance of power between 
countries of origin and countries of destination. The 
power relationship is revealed where industrialised 
countries tie issues together in ways that extract a 
high price if a developing country violates their mig-
ration interests, for example by linking trade agree-
ments to migration constraints.93 Another expression 
of the power imbalance is arrangements that make 
development aid conditional on curbing migration, 
which development actors frequently criticise.94 
In the past, informal and opaque consultation pro-
cesses at regional level in particular have enabled 
industrialised countries to assert their migration inter-
ests.95 Whether the destination countries are interested 
in international arrangements depends on how con-
troversial labour immigration is domestically and 
whether trade unions and other organisations press 
for observance of international norms. Numerous 
examples can be found where proposals for interna-
tional regimes to facilitate labour migration – such 
as free trade arrangements with a freedom of move-
ment component – encounter resistance from those 
who fear a loss of income and opportunities for the 
existing population. Against this background, restric-
tive tendencies often gain the upper hand, because 
the potential macroeconomic gains of migration are 
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experienced less directly than the individual losses 
to autochthonous workers facing pay cuts or unem-
ployment.96 
But the distribution of bargaining power can 
change too. In the context of European efforts to per-
suade African states to tighten control over migration, 
we have observed the governments of countries of 
origin and transit leveraging the EU’s fixation on bor-
der security to their advantage. If enough pressure is 
applied, countries of origin may be able to ensure the 
enforcement of international agreements on labour 
migration, as was the case with regard to the Global 
Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of 
Health Personnel, which the World Health Organisa-
tion adopted in 2010 at the demand of countries of 
origin.97 
Lack of Normative Framework 
The negative impacts of fragmentation and power 
imbalance are further exacerbated by the lack of 
normative standards. International consultation 
processes are – as described above – frequently kept 
deliberately informal and avoid seeking normative 
limits to the interest-driven negotiation of bilateral 
and multilateral migration agreements. UNHCR’s 
internationally binding mandate applies only to 
asylum-seekers and refugees, while the work of IOM 
is not based on a human rights mandate anchored in 
international law. As described, there are of course 
international legal principles that are relevant to the 
protection of migrants, including both general human 
rights instruments and the ILO and UN conventions 
on protection of migrant workers. Yet the conventions 
have little influence on the actual practice of inter-
national migration policy, as they have only been 
ratified by a small group of states, most of them coun-
tries of origin. Moreover, the origins of the conven-
tions lie in the era of labour recruitment beginning in 
the 1950s, and often fail to adequately address the 
modern realities of mixed and irregular migration.98 
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Over the past decade forums like the GFMD have 
generated a broad consensus on issues like ethical 
recruitment practices, transferability of social insur-
ance entitlements and improving terms for remit-
tances. This has gone hand in hand with an acknowl-
edgement of the need to further strengthen the labour 
and social rights of migrants – especially with respect 
to family unification and residence status. One possi-
bility would be to reinforce binding multilateral ar-
rangements like the UN Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families. Another – possibly preferable – option 
would involve concentrating on the implementation 
of existing norms and standards and pursuing prag-
matic “soft law” approaches such as proposed in the 
Nansen Initiative’s MICIC project. Certain challenges, 
such as fair and ethical recruitment, can only be dealt 
with multilaterally, while in other areas – such as the 
issue of climate and migration – regional approaches 
combined with “soft law” elements are more promis-
ing (“mini-multilateralism”). Such approaches can 
pursue a medium- to long-term objective of achieving 
multilateral agreement and as such contribute to 
ending the fragmentation of migration policy. 
Researchers point to the fact that there is as yet no 
separate legal framework for the protection and sup-
port of “survival migrants” or “crisis migrants”, in the 
sense of those forced to leave their home country by 
poverty, natural disaster or lack of perspectives.99 This 
further exacerbates the development risks inherent in 
the phenomenon of involuntary migration. 
Influence of Other Policy Areas 
What makes it so difficult to establish an effective 
global migration regime is that migration policy is 
influenced by a multitude of other policy areas. In the 
literature this phenomenon is referred to as “overlap-
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ping regimes”.100 So there are for example interde-
pendencies between the global refugee protection 
regime and the international agreements on human 
rights, labour migration, humanitarian assistance and 
security.101 The environment for labour migration is 
in turn influenced by trade regimes, human rights, 
labour regulations and criminal law.102 Conversely, 
this places tight limits on the effectiveness of migra-
tion policy in the narrow sense. Focusing solely on 
border controls is not sufficient for influencing migra-
tory movements in the long run. Conditions in coun-
tries of origin and destination are just as important – 
and these are influenced by trade policy, agricultural 
and fisheries policy, environmental policy, and 
security policy.103 
In the absence of a coherent overall approach this 
leads to a situation where development efforts aiming 
to create perspectives on the ground and thus reduce 
migration pressure are contradicted by activities in 
other policy areas. EU trade and fisheries policy 
supplies one negative example that has come in for 
sustained criticism: The EU’s fisheries policy and trade 
agreements with African states have generated migra-
tion push factors by depleting African fishery stocks, 
making local agricultural and consumer goods un-
competitive, and destroying employment opportuni-
ties and livelihoods. Involuntary migratory move-
ments are often another symptom of such mistaken 
economic and trade policies. 
In summary, many of the current global govern-
ance deficits are problematic from a development per-
spective. The lack of binding rights for migrants 
means that yardsticks for the substance of migration 
policy are lacking. Intergovernmental negotiations re-
stricted to selected issues where it is easiest to achieve 
political agreement contribute little to solving the 
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wider problems.104 Only if the difficult questions are 
tackled systematically and with an eye to a coherent 
overall approach will it be possible to substantially 
improve international migration cooperation and 
adapt it to the needs of all relevant actors. Against the 
background of these challenges, the question now is 
what model of global migration governance would be 
desirable from a development perspective. 
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Perspectives for Global Migration Governance 
 
At the present time, efforts are under way to consoli-
date international refugee and migration cooperation 
and to join up existing processes both substantively 
and institutionally. This opens a window of oppor-
tunity for deeper reforms. In fact the international 
migration regime could potentially advance from 
laggard to forerunner of international cooperation. 
It is above all the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
2015, and the United Nations Summit for Refugees 
and Migrants in September 2016 that have injected 
new life into international cooperation on refugee and 
migration policy. The planned global compacts on 
refugees and migration offer good staring points for 
improvements. These developments can be expected 
to impact on the division of responsibilities between 
UNHCR, IOM and ILO, and to add to the political 
weight of the existing intergovernmental consultative 
forums, especially GFMD and the High Level Dialogue. 
So global migration governance looks set to gain 
growing momentum in the coming years. 
The upcoming modifications to global refugee and 
migration governance involve both the legal norms 
and the shape of the institutional structures. While 
UNHCR’s responsibility for the refugee compact is 
uncontested and there is no debate over its central, 
normative role in international refugee protection, 
the planned migration compact will be associated 
with significant changes. The final declaration of the 
UN Summit accords both IOM and the UN Secretariat 
a role in supporting the compact’s drafting, with con-
tributions from relevant UN agencies and civil society 
actors flowing into the process. 
This approach represented a pragmatic compro-
mise to get talks on the migration compact started 
and secure the participation of relevant actors. Ques-
tions regarding how exactly the tasks will be distrib-
uted after the compact has been negotiated and which 
actors will lead its implementation and monitoring 
remain undecided – yet will be decisive for the future 
shape and efficacy of global migration governance, 
and are as such also politically relevant for Germany. 
What is needed from a development perspective is a 
normative and institutional reordering of global 
migration policy, to put it in a position to fulfil at 
least five tasks: 
 (1) To enable a fair reconciliation of interests 
between countries of origin, transit and destina-
tion; 
 (2) To ensure rights-based policies that protect 
the fundamental rights of migrants and refugees, 
prevent discrimination against them, and permit 
their economic and social participation; 
 (3) To define minimum standards for migrations 
and integration – for example in the areas of re-
cruitment and family unification – and to provide 
structures to monitor observance of same; 
 (4) To promote safe pathways for refugees and 
migrants to reduce irregular movements; 
 (5) To offer a framework for local integration and 
reintegration. 
In the following we outline three possible options for 
developing global migration governance in that direc-
tion: firstly, a consolidation of the existing structure 
with a strengthening of regional processes; secondly, 
a comprehensive reform of IOM; and thirdly an add-on 
to the existing structures by establishing a viable 
migration secretariat. Each has its own advantages 
and drawbacks. 
Option 1: Consolidation and Regionalisation 
The first option would be to consolidate the present 
structures, while improving regional capacities. This 
would continue the road already taken by the UN 
General Assembly in September 2016, when it granted 
IOM the status of a “related agency” without giving it 
a normative mandate. This upgraded IOM and granted 
it access to the UN negotiating processes, which is 
relevant in particular for the drafting of the planned 
migration compact and the implementation of the 
SDGs. Its global presence makes IOM the best-placed 
organisation to tackle the operational challenges 
associated with the management of migration move-
ments. In the course of the past fifteen years a func-
tioning division of labour has emerged between 
UNHCR and IOM, which already complement one 
another in many crisis situations. And finally, IOM is 
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predestined to strengthen regional processes, as it 
already functions as the secretariat for a string of 
regional consultative processes and could further 
advance the expansion of these structures. The advan-
tage of regional approaches is their confidence-
building effect; and agreeing on common standards 
is easier at the regional level than at the global. More-
over, in the regional context it is frequently possible 
to achieve cooperation gains – for example in the form 
of regional freedom of movement – that are impossi-
ble at global level. 
At first glance retaining today’s global migration 
architecture and further strengthening regional pro-
cesses would appear less conflictual than a sweeping 
reform. Yet keeping the existing structure would actu-
ally involve considerable risks. IOM is in no position to 
mediate effectively between the interests of countries 
of origin and destination, as it lacks both the norma-
tive foundation and the requisite financial autonomy. 
That problem will only worsen if the status quo is pre-
served. Only a global governance framework capable 
of setting minimum standards and defining responsi-
bilities can effectively tackle the challenges created 
by mixed migratory movements – as well as by the 
changing patterns associated with new phenomena 
such as climate-driven migration and growing tempo-
rary and circular migration. 
The SDG target of maximising the positive devel-
opment impacts of migration is also relevant. Meeting 
it will require a coherent and internationally coordi-
nated approach that orientates migration policy more 
strongly on development needs (and as such contrib-
utes to fighting the causes of refugee flows).105 Bilater-
al and regional coordination processes encounter 
limits here. They are undoubtedly important compo-
nents in any reform of global migration governance, 
but in the absence of a global framework will remain 
inadequate. 
Option 2: Reform and Expand IOM – “IOM 2.0” 
A second option would be a comprehensive reform of 
IOM to turn it into a true “global migration organisa-
tion”. It would have to fulfil at least four basic func-
tions: (1) to accumulate and process expertise, above 
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January 2016), 41–44. 
all by gathering and analysing migration-related data 
and conducting its own research; (2) to document, 
compare and evaluate migration policies at the level 
of individual states, as well as regionally and globally; 
(3) to supply migration-related services on behalf of 
member states and UN agencies; and (4) to provide 
strategic planning and prioritisation for global migra-
tion policy, including early warning of migration risks 
and deficits in migrant protections. The agency would 
need to be guided by a normative mandate, by a “mis-
sion statement” defining which tasks it takes on and 
which it does not. 
In its present form IOM cannot satisfy such require-
ments. For one thing, it possesses no mandate under 
international law; for another it is constrained by 
a project-based funding structure that forces it to 
pursue permanent – and often uncritical – funding 
acquisition. If IOM were to be expanded into a global 
migration organisation it would therefore need a 
rights-based mandate that permitted it to address the 
existing gap in migrant protections. And it would 
require secure basic funding to make it immune to 
short-term national interests. The example of evalua-
tion illustrates the importance of this. Despite decades 
of project experience there is still a lack of under-
standing of the conditions for successful reintegra-
tion, because the states interested in enforcing returns 
are often not interested in funding evaluations. A 
financially independent IOM would be able to plan for 
the longer term and become a driving force for a new 
sustainable migration policy. 
But addressing these issues would create tensions 
between the operational and normative functions of 
an “IOM 2.0”. The usefulness of concentrating all 
migration-related questions in a single global agency 
is also questionable, as the issue touches on many 
areas where other UN agencies possess a long track 
record of expertise, for example in relation to develop-
ment (UNDP), labour (ILO), human rights (OHCHR), 
demographics (UNFPA) and environment (UNEP). If 
the issue is dealt with by a single agency acting in 
isolation, there is a risk that important aspects will 
be neglected, or even counterproductive outcomes 
produced. 
  
Perspectives for Global Migration Governance 
SWP Berlin 






Option 3: Establish a Viable UN Migration 
Secretariat 
The third option would be to establish a viable, perma-
nent UN migration secretariat. The parallels to other 
policy areas such as climate protection are obvious. 
While initially charged with supporting and coordi-
nating the intergovernmental talks on a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the focus of the work 
of the UN Climate Change Secretariat has shifted in 
the interim. Now it concentrates on providing tech-
nical expertise to assist the signatories in implement-
ing the convention. Comparable tasks will be on the 
agenda when it comes to implementing the migration-
related SDGs and negotiating and implementing the 
planned global migration compact. A comparable UN 
migration secretariat will therefore need powers that 
go beyond mere process coordination and instead 
prioritise monitoring and technical support. 
The secretariat could be created from scratch or 
assembled out of existing structures. One obvious 
starting point would be the Global Migration Group 
(GMG), which was in fact originally set up to improve 
coordination of the UN’s migration-related activities. 
To date, however, it has – not least on account of its 
inadequate resourcing and the conflicts of interest 
between the participating UN agencies – only been 
able to provide limited support for reciprocal ex-
change between the UN agencies. The model’s advan-
tage would be that the GMG already brings together 
most of the UN institutions dealing with questions of 
migration. One alternative would be to upgrade and 
formalise the Global Forum on Migration and Develop-
ment. In his March 2017 report on the future of inter-
national cooperation in the sphere of migration, then 
UN Special Representative for International Migration 
Peter Sutherland proposed expanding the role of 
GFMD in the evaluation of state migration policy and 
establishing a permanent GFMD secretariat for that 
purpose. Here it should be noted that the forum’s 
present informal character represents added value, as 
it offers states a confidential venue to discuss contro-
versial issues. One variant on these models might be 
to use the World Bank’s expertise platform KNOMAD 
to support the work of a future migration secretariat. 
KNOMAD could supply the knowledge required for the 
work of the secretariat and conduct accompanying 
evaluations of the implementation of the SDGs and 
the Global Migration Compact. This variant would 
involve strengthening KNOMAD’s structures and 
finances. 
Regardless of the specific institutional details, the 
secretariat model would offer a number of advantages 
over the option of concentrating all migration issues 
in a single organisation. A secretariat would have 
direct recourse to the expertise of all the relevant UN 
actors, and it would be in a position to operate as an 
“honest broker” offering a forum where countries of 
origin, transit and destination could negotiate as 
equals – for example on the details and implementa-
tion of mobility partnerships, labour migration agree-
ments and transnational training partnerships. Such a 
structure would enable migration and refugee issues 
to be anchored as cross-cutting issues in all aspects of 
the UN’s work. Finally, the secretariat model could 
represent an inclusive approach creating openings to 
bring in civil society and the private sector. 
Like the first two, this option also has a number of 
drawbacks. In view of the size and operational capaci-
ties of IOM there is a danger of duplicating structures 
and creating rivalry between two migration-specific 
organisations. This problem could be defused by 
having IOM concentrate on its role as an implement-
ing organisation, without having to bear responsibil-
ity for policy formulation at the same time. Generally 
speaking, a secretariat would only be productive 
from the development angle if the new organisation – 
again analogously to the international Climate 
Change Secretariat – also became the guardian of 
an ambitious global migration compact. 
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Consequences for German Politics 
 
Germany has come to be regarded as a major player in 
international refugee and migration policy, not least 
on account of its acceptance of a large number of refu-
gees in 2015/2015. That decision drew criticism from 
many other EU governments but was viewed as exem-
plary by governments in other parts of the world – 
and by civil society actors worldwide. This new promi-
nence also means that the German government has to 
position itself with regard to fundamental questions 
of refugee and migration policy – and is expected to 
take the lead in some of these areas. 
The German government has already responded by 
stepping up its participation in relevant international 
processes: a leading role in European refugee policy 
and in cooperation with African states in the context 
of the Valetta and Khartoum processes; 2017/2018 co-
chair of GFMD with Morocco; and support for IOM’s 
new Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) 
in Berlin. This level of visibility and the associated 
expectations of German politics can be expected to 
endure. They could even intensify in connection with 
the process of implementing the SDGs and preparing 
the global and migration compacts. 
Not all states agree on the need to modify global 
governance structures in this field. The experience of 
cooperation to date demonstrates how cautious states 
are to relinquish real or supposed powers of decision-
making and intervention in migration policy. This 
reserve will in all likelihood continue to apply in 
future cooperation – especially given that it is any-
thing but clear what line central actors like the United 
States will take on multilateral structures in refugee 
and migration policy. In fact, the power of the state is 
often an illusion, because today many areas of migra-
tion policy are influenced more strongly by economic 
and political globalisation and regional integration 
processes than by the policies of individual states. 
The SDG process and the global compacts on refu-
gees and migration open up new vistas for global 
migration governance. The latest developments offer 
governments and civil society a hitherto unique op-
portunity to reshape future international cooperation. 
The blurring of traditional divisions countries of 
origin, transit and destination opens doors to new 
coalitions. 
The German government should engage in this 
process by signing the migration-related ILO and UN 
conventions, and persuading European partners to 
do the same. A commitment to the ILO Multilateral 
Framework on Labour Migration and its application 
would also send a constructive message by furthering 
the international dissemination of a rights-based 
approach to labour migration. The GFMD – especially 
in the context of the German/Moroccan co-chair – 
could contribute to that process because its informal 
structure offers space for discussion of difficult and 
controversial questions. The forum could stimulate 
ideas for norm-setting and disseminate migration-
related expertise. That means making the negotiations 
as inclusive as possible and systematically bringing in 
civil society and private-sector actors. 
In institutional terms the German government 
should weigh up which of the outlined options offers 
the best framework for effective and development-
promoting global migration governance. Whichever 
is chosen, it must be ensured that the new structure 
enables effective implementation and evaluation of 
the migration-related SDGs and the global compacts 
on refugees and migration that are currently under 
negotiation. Should a secretariat solution be chosen, 
Geneva would be an ideal location, with relevant ex-
pertise already present there in the form of IOM, ILO, 
UNHCR, UNDP and smaller initiatives on IDPs. If the 
UN were to seek a different host country, Germany 
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